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In the past two decades a new approach to mining history has emerged 
to ask, in effect, what happens after the gold rush. Authors such as Ri-
chard V. Francaviglia, Ben Marsh, William Wyckoff, and more recently 
David Robertson have all extended their narratives beyond the demise of 
mining towns to question what they consider to be the “mining imagin-
ary,” the idea that the historical end-point for mining activity is inevitably 
community collapse and ecological destruction. They provide valuable 
case studies where communities have survived past the end of mining, 
diversifying their economies through industrial activity or the develop-
ment of tourism. Historical memory often provides a sense of continuity 
for these communities, as mining heritage landscapes and museums be-
come touchstones of tourist activity, and ecological restoration activities 
reveal a deep sense of attachment to the mining landscape. For this loosely 
defined community resilience school of mining history, mining is not an 
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ephemeral economic activity but offers communities a long-term sense 
of deep intimacy with their history of labour within the local landscape.1
Without a doubt, this newer approach to mining history provides a 
powerful corrective to environmental histories that position mineral ex-
ploitation as a physical and symbolic marker of environmental decline. 
Some authors, such as Jared Diamond, have gone so far as to evoke mining 
as a metaphor for the ecological collapse of civilization.2 However import-
ant it may be to critique such overblown, declensionist narratives, much 
of the published work of the community resilience school suffers from 
its own limitations. Many of these scholars extrapolate their theories of 
community renewal and survival from individual case studies rather than 
regional, national, or international studies, and most of the case stud-
ies are situated in or close to relatively well populated areas of Britain, 
the United States, and southern Canada. In these regions, communities 
are likely to have better access to markets and infrastructure to support 
economic diversification. In general, the impact of mines on individual 
communities varies across time and space according to several regional 
factors. The sociologist Lisa Wilson has argued, for example, that the con-
sequences and impacts of mining on local communities are conditioned 
by the nature of the resource being exploited, the type of mining technol-
ogy employed, the status of labour−management relations, fluctuations in 
international commodity prices, and varying levels of regional economic 
dependence on mining.3 Similarly, reacting to simplistic models of re-
source-based development versus underdevelopment, rural sociologists 
Scott Frickel and William Freudenberg have called for detailed historic-
al-geographical studies of “the ways in which the relationships between 
resource extraction and regional development have changed over time.”4
Drawing on these ideas of regional heterogeneity, this paper will argue 
that themes such as continuity and local attachment to place often have 
very little relevance in hinterland regions such as Canada’s remote terri-
torial north, where geographically isolated communities and mining oper-
ations sit at the economic margins of an international commodity trade, 
and where historical experiences of collapse and continuity are governed 
more by mineral price fluctuations than the ties that bind a community 
to its local place.5 Abandoned mines and ghost towns, or at least severe-
ly depressed former mining settlements, remain a prominent feature of 
the northern Canadian landscape. Another characteristic of the northern 
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Canadian context is the presence of a significant Aboriginal population, 
who may interpret historical mining developments undertaken by settler 
society as a colonial appropriation of their local environments and a threat 
to their local attachment to place, impacts symbolized by the physical leg-
acies of abandoned mine sites in their traditional territories.6
As the literature on the “mining imaginary” suggests, however, mine 
abandonment does not constitute an end to the material and social rela-
tions that mining generates. Many former mine sites in northern Can-
ada (and around the globe) are seeing renewed mineral exploration and 
development activity.7 The redevelopment of previously worked mineral 
deposits may be driven by rising commodity prices, changing extraction 
technologies, and improvements in transportation and access that permit 
formerly uneconomic deposits to become attractive to investors and min-
ing companies. In some cases, this redevelopment has the prospect of re-
newing long-closed, once-profitable mines and reanimating depressed or 
even moribund mining communities. This phenomenon intersects with 
ongoing reclamation, rehabilitation and/or re-use of abandoned mine 
landscapes; in some cases, redevelopment may take place simultaneously 
with post-closure cleanup and remediation activities.
The redevelopment of formerly abandoned mines raises both theor-
etical and practical questions for understanding the impact of mineral 
development on resource-dependent regions and the environment. The 
classical image of the “natural history” of a mine, outlined by Homer 
Aschmann, suggests a linear (and inevitable, based on the finitude of the 
resource) process of mine development and exhaustion, closure and/or 
abandonment.8 Similarly, the idea of the mining cycle is widely promoted 
by the industry as a model for understanding mining’s purportedly tran-
sient impacts on local environments, and is even linked to the notion of 
“sustainable” mining.9 This notion of a mining cycle may, to some extent, 
accommodate the “repass” phenomenon, whereby changing technology or 
market and regulatory conditions make possible the renewed exploitation 
of formerly profitable mineral deposits (though often under very different 
scales of operation, capitalization, labour arrangements, etc.).10 But this 
cyclical, yet ultimately terminal model fails to account for the afterlife of 
closed mines, in both physical and human terms.
Our research suggests that the environmental and social conflicts sur-
rounding mining do not dissipate with closure and abandonment; rather, 
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historical discord over mining developments is frequently revisited and 
re-engaged during the redevelopment or remediation phases, if under dif-
ferent circumstances. Renewed activities at former mine sites take place 
within the context of the ongoing environmental implications of previous 
mining, including acid mine drainage, waste piles, long-term landscape 
disturbances, etc. The advent of redevelopment and/or reclamation also 
raises economic and cultural questions surrounding both current and 
former mineral development, including: the costs and human hazards 
associated with environmental liabilities from abandoned mines and 
their cleanup; the status of local mining-dependent communities and 
infrastructure; alternative economic development prospects; and public 
perception (positive or negative) of previous rounds of mining activity.11 
This phenomenon, then, challenges the notion of the “finality” of the min-
ing cycle and demands a reconceptualization of these reanimated, or not-
quite-dead places that takes into account both their histories and the con-
temporary challenges posed by mineral redevelopment in formerly active 
territories. If the collapsed communities left in the wake of mine closure 
are known as “ghost” towns, we suggest these sites may be thought of as 
“zombie” mines.12
It is difficult to determine the precise number of potential zombie 
mines in northern Canada, given the sometimes disaggregated nature 
of public information on abandoned mines. In the north, remediation of 
mines that have reverted to public control slowly became a priority for 
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC; formerly Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development Canada and Indian and Northern Af-
fairs) as part of the broader Northern Contaminants Program established 
in 1991 to address a broad spectrum of contaminants such as persistent 
organic pollutants, radionuclides, and heavy metals that have concentrat-
ed in the region from sources further south. In keeping with the man-
date of the NCP, subsequent remediation projects have tended to revolve 
around technical engineering issues associated with persistent toxins 
rather than the historical social and political conflicts that attended the 
development of the mines.13 In terms of toxic sites requiring remediation, 
the Commissioner of the Environment in the federal Auditor General’s of-
fice identified the issue of abandoned mines as a significant environmental 
and financial liability in northern Canada. In a 2002 report, the Commis-
sioner highlighted the fact that INAC had identified thirty priority sites, 
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seventeen of which required urgent action in terms of remediation. The 
department also identified twenty-nine additional sites that are suspect-
ed of being contaminated. The Commissioner’s report estimated the total 
clean-up bill for the remaining abandoned mines at $555 million (a severe 
underestimate), all of it public money because, prior to the diamond min-
ing era in the late 1990s, no financial security was collected from mining 
companies to cover remediation costs.14 INAC or territorial government 
authorities are currently overseeing remediation, assessment, and/or 
monitoring activities at sixteen of these contaminated mine sites in Nuna-
vut, Yukon, and the Northwest Territories. In addition, private companies 
have attempted to redevelop at least six mine sites spread throughout the 
territorial north that had previously closed, with four of these sites also 
simultaneously undergoing remediation (Table 11.1).
This chapter examines two of the largest zombie mines in the Great 
Slave Lake Region: the Pine Point lead-zinc mine east of Hay River and 
the notorious Giant gold mine near Yellowknife. The key issues at these 
two abandoned sites are very different: at Giant, the most prominent en-
vironmental concern is the containment of arsenic stored on site, while 
at Pine Point, massive landscape change is the mine’s most important 
lasting legacy. Yet in both cases, nearby Aboriginal communities (Fort 
Resolution and K’atl’odeeche First Nation near Pine Point; Dettah and 
Ndilo adjacent to Giant Mine) frame their historical understanding of 
these mines in terms of colonial land appropriation and environmental 
degradation, historical injustices that today shape their responses to the 
reanimation of these mines. In contrast, the non-Native communities as-
sociated with the mines have promoted preservation of a proud mining 
history reminiscent of other local mining heritage campaigns in North 
America. In an online forum and memorial, former residents of Pine 
Point celebrate the history of the town as a suburban paradise, an exer-
cise in nostalgia and memory that is captured brilliantly in the National 
Film Board multi-media documentary Welcome to Pine Point.15 Similarly, 
the Northwest Territories Mining Heritage Society promotes an idealized 
historical understanding of gold mining at Yellowknife as the progenitor 
of modernity and civilization in the north, and the organization is very 
active in trying to preserve the material culture (equipment, headframes, 
buildings, etc.) and memories of the “good old days” of early gold min-
ing.16 The boundaries between these contrasting Native and non-Native 
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Site Territory Issues Operational 
period
Current  
Status
Cantung NWT/Yu-
kon
Heavy metals; 
acid mine 
drainage 
potential
1962-1986; 
reopened 2003-
04; 2005-09; 
2010-present)
Currently 
undergoing 
redevelopment 
and remediation 
Colomac 
Mine
NWT Cyanide; 
hydrocarbons 
Operations 
1989-1997
Remediation 
2007-2011; 
monitoring 
Con Mine NWT Arsenic in tail-
ings; landscape 
impacts
Operations 
1938-2003
Remediation 
since 2007
Contact  
Lake Mine
NWT Arsenic and 
uranium
Silver in the 
1930s, uranium 
1949-50, and 
irregular opera-
tions to 1980
Currently 
undergoing 
remediation and 
redevelopment
Discovery NWT Mercury 
contamination
Operations 
1950-1969
Remediation 
1998-2001; 
ongoing moni-
toring; redevel-
opment of area 
as Yellowknife 
Gold Project 
after purchase by 
Tyhee in 2010 
El Bonanza/
Bonanza
NWT Hydrocarbons; 
diesel drums; 
waste rock in 
Silver Lake
Silver mining 
1934-40; irreg-
ular activity 
1965-1984;
Remediation 
commenced 
2009
Faro Mine Yukon Acid mine drain-
age; heavy metal 
contamination
Operations 
1965-98
Remediation 
planning 
ongoing
Giant Mine NWT Arsenic stored 
in tailings and 
underground
Operations 
1948- 2004
Environmental 
assessment of 
remediation  
plan ongoing
Indore/
Beaverlodge 
(Hottah 
Lake)
NWT Radioactive 
tailings; asbestos
Intermittent 
operations 
1950-56
Undergoing 
assessment with 
remediation 
pending
Table 11.1: Mines Undergoing Remediation and/or Redevelopment in Canada’s 
Territorial North
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Site Territory Issues Operational 
period
Current Status
Keno Hill Yukon Zinc in water Operations 
1914-1989
Remediation and 
redevelopment
Lupin NWT Cyanide Operations 
1982-2005
Test drilling 
for further 
development 
commenced 2011
Nanisivik Nunavut Heavy metal 
contamination 
(zinc, lead, 
cadmium)
Operations 
1976-2002
Remediation 
since 2002 
and ongoing 
monitoring
Mt. Nansen Yukon Cyanide and 
heavy metals in 
tailings
Operation  
1968-69,  
1975-76,  
1996-98;
Remediation 
and monitoring 
ongoing since 
1999
North Inca NWT Fuel Tanks; 
asbestos
Exploration 
mining 1945-49
Remediation 
commenced 
2009
Port Radium NWT Uranium and 
copper; elevated 
radiation; 
Operations 
1932-1982
Remediation 
completed, 2005-
2008; ongoing 
monitoring
Pine Point NWT Landscape 
impacts
Operations 
1964-1988
Redevelopment 
currently 
proposed
Rayrock NWT Radioactive 
tailings
Operations 
1957-1959
Remediation 
completed 1997 
and ongoing 
monitoring 
Silver Bear 
Properties
NWT Heavy metals 
(cadmium, 
lead, mercury, 
uranium, zinc 
and arsenic) 
Operations early 
1960s to 1985 at 
four mines
Remediation 
commenced 
2009
(Sources: AANDC, Contaminants and Remediation Directorate, “Contaminated Sites Remedia-
tion: What’s  Happening in the Sahtu?,” March 2009 http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collec-
tion_2010/ainc-inac/R1-27-2009-eng.pdf;  AANDC, Major Mineral Projects and Deposits North 
of 60 Degrees, accessed March 3, 2012, http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ/
STAGING/texte-text/mm_mmpd-ld_1333034932925_eng.html; AANDC, Northern Contami-
nants Program, last updated August 15, 2012, http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100035611).
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attitudes to mining in the past and present are not always neatly drawn. 
The Aboriginal communities adjacent to these mines often share a sense of 
pride in the mining past, particularly their own involvement in the min-
ing workforce or experience with life in an idealized modern town such 
as Pine Point, while the non-Native community may share concerns about 
long term environmental problems at the mines, as is evident in the recent 
involvement of the Yellowknife city council and the environmental NGO 
Alternatives North in the environmental assessment of the federal govern-
ment’s arsenic remediation plan at Giant Mine.17 Despite this fluid nature 
of various community engagements with reanimated mines, we argue that 
remediation and redevelopment projects force Aboriginal communities in 
particular to revisit their uniquely conflictual rather than consensual local 
mining histories, negotiating the reanimation of zombie mines though 
the historical lens of colonial dispossession and the environmental injus-
tices associated with the original mining development.
Mining the Great Slave Region
The history of mining in Canada’s territorial north properly begins with 
the Yukon Gold Rush in 1898, but the first large-scale industrial mines—
what we would today call mega-projects, complete with capital-intensive 
industrial development and transportation infrastructure—did not ap-
pear until the early twentieth century. Prior to the Second World War, the 
number of major developments remained small, limited to the Keno Hill 
silver mines (1913), the Port Radium radium and uranium mine (1932), 
and three closely related mines on the northern shore of Great Slave Lake: 
Con (1938), Negus (1939), and Giant (1948, first staked in 1935). In the 
1950s and 1960s, at the height of the post-war economic boom, mining 
companies proceeded with significant exploration and development ac-
tivities at such sites as the lead-zinc deposits at Pine Point, NWT, lead 
deposits at Faro, Yukon (the Cyprus-Anvil Mine), and nickel at Rankin 
Inlet, NWT (Fig. 1). The pattern of development was haphazard, a con-
stant logistical tug-of-war among factors such as the ore grade and the 
size of the deposit, its proximity to viable transportation routes, and pre-
vailing commodity prices. Nevertheless, after the Second World War the 
Canadian government actively promoted northern mineral development 
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as a means of promoting settlement, modernizing the region, and pulling 
local Native inhabitants out of their anachronistic hunting and trapping 
economy. The government took an active role promoting a mineral-led 
opening of the north, funding transportation and hydroelectric infra-
structure to facilitate rapid development of minerals. Certainly the en-
thusiasm of post-war government boosters was abetted by the fact that the 
initial gold rush at Yellowknife in the 1930s, and the longevity of the Con, 
Negus, and Giant mines on the north shore of the lake, had provided the 
economic base for a 1930s frontier outpost to grow into a modern town by 
the 1950s.18
Prospectors and mining promoters had been attracted to the min-
eral-rich region around Great Slave Lake as early as the late 1890s, when 
the first claims were staked at Pine Point on the lake’s southern shore by 
prospectors initially interested in silver and gold.19 From 1935 to the early 
2000s, the land around Great Slave Lake within a 250-kilometre radius of 
Yellowknife, particularly to the north, became pock-marked with sixty-five 
 
Fig. 11.1: Major mining developments and communities in the Canadian north in 
the early to mid-twentieth century. Map by Charlie Conway.
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mines, mostly devoted to gold, but also tungsten, uranium, cobalt, nickel, 
lead, zinc, rare earth metals such tantalum and lithium, and, more recent-
ly, diamonds. As of 2006, only one of these sites, the Snap Lake diamond 
mine, remained operational, though the large Ekati and Diavik diamond 
mines just over three hundred kilometres from Yellowknife remain the 
core of the contemporary mining industry in the Northwest Territories. 
Such an intensive regional concentration of mining activity has no histor-
ical parallel in the territorial north other than the much smaller complex 
of uranium, radium, silver, and gold mines developed at the east end of 
Great Bear Lake. Many of the sites in the Yellowknife region were small-
scale operations, never proceeding beyond the advanced exploration or 
bulk-sampling stage of development, and often collapsing after only one or 
two years of unpromising samples. But others, such as the Discovery gold 
mine and town eighty-four kilometres north of Yellowknife that operated 
from 1950 to 1969, or the Colomac gold mine that operated intermittently 
in the 1990s, were full-scale industrial mining operations carved out of 
the northern edge of the boreal forest. By 2005, seventy years of mineral 
extraction had left a legacy of sixty-four abandoned mines in the Yellow-
knife region, though only fourteen of the sites could be considered signifi-
cant producers. At only eleven of these sites have the mining companies 
or governments conducted any remediation or clean-up activities. In one 
case, a small company, Slave Lake Gold Mines Ltd., was in such a hurry 
in 1942 to abandon its increasingly unpromising and short-lived gold and 
tungsten mine on Outpost Island on the East Arm of Great Slave Lake, it 
neglected even to provide for the removal of the miners and their families, 
forcing them to build a barge with lumber from the mine buildings.20
Many of these abandoned mine sites left behind much more than in-
dustrial relics such as old buildings, headframes, and scattered mining 
equipment. At almost all stages of a mine’s development, the social and 
environmental impacts on local Native communities (in this region, the 
Dene) could be severe. At the exploration phase, activities such as cut-
ting seismic lines, road development, burning forest to access prospecting 
sites, and digging test pits and trenches could impact fish and wildlife 
populations and interfere with the hunting and trapping economy. At lar-
ger operations, full-scale development often produced extensive landscape 
changes due to the digging of pits and piling of waste rock. The construc-
tion of instant mining towns brought a sudden influx of outside workers, 
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with the attendant introduction of alcohol, store-bought food, and com-
petition for local wildlife resources (particularly in the pre-Second World 
War mining camps, where miners relied more on wild game for food).21 
Prior to the 1970s, almost no northern mines had developed a Native 
employment policy (the Rankin Inlet nickel mine being a lone exception; 
see Tina Loo’s chapter in this volume).22 Hence few employment or other 
economic benefits accrued to Native communities, other than seasonal 
line-cutting, hauling, road-building, or wood-cutting work, despite the 
impact on the hunting and trapping economy and the fact that much of 
the mining took place on land where claims arising out of Treaty settle-
ments remained unresolved.23 The mining developments around Great 
Slave Lake thus represented the leading edge of industrial colonization 
in the Northwest Territories. Although Native people were never swept 
aside into reserves as in the southern provinces, resource development 
proceeded with almost no meaningful attempt to integrate the Dene into 
the new mining economy and little regard for its impact on the mixed 
subsistence and small-scale trade economy of the Dene.
Perhaps the most severe and persistent legacy arising from min-
ing activity near northern Aboriginal communities was the emission of 
toxins into water, soil, and air at many sites, particularly when ore was 
processed directly at the mine. The processing of gold in particular can 
produce toxic byproducts such as arsenic and cyanide: the former a nat-
urally occurring element that is emitted into the air when ore containing 
arsenic is roasted or into water and soil when released with slag and tail-
ings; the latter, used to extract gold from ore, may subsequently leach into 
soil and water as it is disposed with mine tailings. Heavy metals such as 
lead or zinc may also leach into water and soil depending on the mineral 
composition of mine wastes. Acid mine drainage, or low-pH mine water 
produced through the oxidization of sulphides, may also severely impact 
aquatic ecosystems depending on local conditions.24 All of these toxins 
persist well after the closure of a mine, presenting environmental risks 
and liabilities that have become a critical public policy issue in northern 
Canada in recent years.25 Most immediately, the environmental legacies 
of abandoned mines present grave concerns for residents of the region, 
particularly Aboriginal communities adjacent to the mines where human 
health and hunting economies may be impacted by landscape-scale eco-
logical changes or toxins accumulating in water, fish, and game animals.
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Arsenic Emissions at Giant Mine
The abandoned Giant Yellowknife gold mine represents one of the most 
high-profile cases of mine contamination in northern Canada. Although 
gold was discovered at the site as part of the early gold rush that had led to 
the development of the Con and Negus mines in the 1930s, the company 
Giant Yellowknife Mines Ltd. did not pour its first gold brick until 1948, 
as markets for precious metals recovered after the Second World War. 
Because the ore at Giant was contained within arsenopyrite rock forma-
tions, the company had to build a roasting facility to burn off sulfur that 
prevented separation of gold using the standard cyanide chemical leach-
ing method. The roasting process also produced large volumes of highly 
toxic arsenic trioxide in the form of a fine airborne dust, which spread 
from a smokestack broadly over the Yellowknife area. By 1949, airborne 
emissions of arsenic trioxide from the roasting facility at Giant Mine had 
reached 7,500 kilograms per day.26 During this early period, the company 
had no pollution abatement installed on the roaster stack, though emis-
sions control technology, particularly the Cottrell electrostatic precipita-
tor, had been available since 1908.27
Very quickly the area surrounding Yellowknife became an example of 
what several environmental historians have described more generally as 
“landscapes of exposure”—toxic hot spots that present enormous public 
health and ecological concerns due to the heavy loading of industrial pol-
lutants.28 The situation was particularly dire for the nearby Yellowknives 
Dene First Nation communities now known as Ndilo (on Latham Island 
adjacent to Yellowknife) and Dettah (on the east side of Yellowknife Bay 
across from Con Mine). These two villages were often downwind of the 
pollution from the roaster stack, as the breeze funnelled down from the 
mine site at the head of Yellowknife’s Back Bay to the town sites located 
in the front part of Yellowknife Bay. The potential for arsenic poisoning 
in these communities was high due to the use of local berries in the diet 
and the practice of melting snow for drinking water. The Giant Mine site 
was, in fact, a very important area for the Yellowknives’ berry-picking and 
hunting activities, an area which they eventually abandoned as the dangers 
of arsenic became known in the community.29 In 1951, arsenic pollution 
resulted in tragedy for the Yellowknives, as a two-year-old Native child 
died due to arsenic poisoning, most likely from drinking contaminated 
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snowmelt. The company offered the family $750 in compensation for the 
loss of their child.30 Yellowknives Dene members have suggested that ar-
senic-related sickness such as skin irritation or hair loss were particularly 
acute during this period, while one local physician recalled at least one 
case of arsenic-related skin conditions such as keratosis (thickening of the 
skin), hyperpigmentation (black spots on the skin), and paresthesias (a 
burning sensation in the extremities) in a middle-aged patient from Det-
tah in 1954.31
The impacts of the mine were not limited to humans and were not 
confined to the issue of air pollution. Environmental studies from the 
1970s suggested that arsenic emissions from mine tailings and settled 
dust had destroyed all biota in Baker Creek, a stream running through 
the Giant site that had once been a significant fishing area for the Yellow-
knives. Emissions of sludge from Giant, Con, and Negus created a zone 
of influence that extended three kilometres into Yellowknife Bay, where 
phytoplankton had disappeared.32 Members of the Yellowknives Dene 
First Nation remember stories of sled dogs, cattle, and chickens dying 
from drinking or swimming in tailings water.33 Local testimony from 
Yellowknife’s non-Native residents recalls that several horses had died in 
1949 due to drinking melting snow water in spring, and the entire cattle 
herd from the fledging Bevan farm in the area died from arsenic poison-
ing close to 1951.34
In response to pressure from local public health officials and federal 
bureaucrats within the departments of Indian Affairs, Health and Wel-
fare, and Resources and Development, the mining company installed a 
Cottrell electrostatic precipitator in 1951.35 This technology uses an elec-
trical current to knock solid particles out of air emissions, similar to how 
static electricity on an older, pre-digital television screen collects dust.36 To 
provide more refined air filtration, the company installed a baghouse in 
1958, essentially a second-stage air filter that further blocked small arsenic 
trioxide particles produced in the roasting facility. In 1957 the company 
also began partly to remove arsenic from mine tailings in order to mitigate 
water pollution in Yellowknife’s Back Bay. The installation of pollution 
control equipment did dramatically reduce the spread of airborne arsenic 
trioxide, as emissions dropped to between two hundred and three hun-
dred kilograms per day by 1959.37 
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This focus on a technological fix to air pollution problems at Giant 
Mine was entirely in keeping with prevailing approaches to smelter pol-
lution problems throughout North America, where governments imposed 
the principle that mitigation rather than outright elimination of pollu-
tion was acceptable so long as the polluter paid the monetary cost. At the 
same time, public health authorities were steeped in the idea that that it 
was possible to determine scientifically a safe level of human exposure for 
every toxic substance, a “dose makes the poison” approach that ignored 
the potential impacts of long-term arsenic exposure. The safe threshold 
level for Yellowknife drinking water, for example, was set at five times the 
current safe level of 0.01 parts per million for drinking water, levels we 
now know can produce serious long-term cancer risk. As long as nobody 
was suffering from acute arsenic poisoning, however, and as long as the 
company was at least attempting to control emissions, Giant Yellowknife 
Mines was allowed to operate full tilt. Certainly in the early to mid-twenti-
eth century, there was no appetite among government regulators in North 
America to impose shutdowns on smelting and roasting facilities; techno-
logical mitigation, dispersal, and dilution remained the dominant public 
response to pollution and public health threats throughout this period.38
But as mentioned above, pollution control technology did not prevent 
all arsenic from entering air or water sources in the Yellowknife region af-
ter the 1950s, particularly as production increases boosted total emissions 
from the stack. In the wake of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), broad 
social acceptance of the environmental costs of industrial growth in North 
America began shifting to concern about the presence of toxic chemicals 
in the human environment, and, slowly, government regulators began to 
respond.39 As Stephen Bocking shows in his chapter in this volume, these 
concerns extended to the contamination of northern environments by 
both distant pollution sources and local industrial developments. In 1965, 
federal public health officials became concerned when testing showed 
persistently high arsenic levels in vegetables and drinking water in the 
Yellowknife area.40 In response, the federal government organized a com-
prehensive study of the issue under the direction of Dr. A. J. DeVilliers 
of the Department of Health and Welfare. Although the testing of water 
bodies, local vegetables, and individuals was highly visible in Yellow-
knife during the study period from 1966 to 1969, results of the survey 
were impossible to obtain, despite repeated requests from local municipal 
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government, public health officials, and Native groups. DeVilliers blamed 
staffing issues on his failure to produce a report, but the lack of public in-
formation about the adverse health impacts of arsenic pollution—indeed, 
the perception that the government might be hiding information—creat-
ed heightened public anxiety and controversy in Yellowknife.41 
In 1975, the issue reached the national media when CBC Radio’s As it 
Happens suggested the results of the DeVillers study had been suppressed, 
particularly sections pointing to high rates of lung cancer in Yellowknife, 
possibly due to long-term exposure to arsenic in the air.42 Public health 
officials in the federal government remained skeptical of the link between 
arsenic and cancer in the Yellowknife area, arguing that many cancer pa-
tients in the local hospital were Inuit from the arctic coast, while Native 
populations from non-arsenic polluted regions such as Whitehorse in the 
Yukon exhibited similar rates of lung cancer.43 Nonetheless, in response to 
local concerns the federal government did initiate new public health stud-
ies in 1975. These surveys found elevated levels of arsenic in hair and urine 
samples taken from mill workers at the mine, but not in the general popu-
lation of Yellowknife and adjacent Native communities.44 Two years later, 
however, the National Indian Brotherhood released its own hair-sample 
study showing high rates of arsenic in twenty-five Native children.45 As 
a further response, the federal government contracted an independent 
body, the Canadian Public Health Association (CPHA), to conduct a study 
of local arsenic contamination in humans and the environment. Much of 
the CPHA’s work focused on urine samples from workers and local Native 
people. After extensive testing, the CPHA concluded once again that the 
impacts were largely confined to the workplace and levels in the general 
population remained below threshold safety levels. The CPHA final report 
recommended ongoing monitoring of arsenic levels, careful washing of 
vegetables and berries, and the trucking of water to Ndilo and Dettah in 
winter, with warnings to locals not to use snow as a source of drinking 
water as studies still indicated high levels of concentration in this source.46 
Further upgrades to the Cottrell precipitator and baghouse equipment 
reduced air emissions from 76.6 mg/Nm3 (milligrams per normal cubic 
metre) in 1975 (when testing began) to 14.07 mg/Nm3 in 1981, part of an 
effort to meeting impending regulations limiting emissions to 20 mg/
Nm3 under the federal government’s Clean Air Act.47 The result was an 
eighty-percent drop in arsenic trioxide in snow by the mid-1980s.48
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Despite such improvements in environmental conditions, the poison-
ing of marginalized Native communities and their local environments in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s through the uncontrolled spread of indus-
trial air pollution clearly resonates with other instances of environmental 
injustice in North America.49 Obviously the mine was situated according 
to the presence of gold rather than along the path of least political resist-
ance associated with many toxic waste facilities. Nonetheless, the growth 
of an industrial frontier on Dene land with no consultation afforded to af-
fected communities, the expansion of mining development and settlement 
on some of the most important Yellowknives Dene hunting and gather-
ing territories, and finally the spread of toxic arsenic into basic sources 
of water, food, and air, suggest the colonial appropriation of land and re-
sources for outside corporate and state interests and the dispossession of 
Native people from significant sources of local subsistence.50
Moreover, as Tim LeCain has argued for other mining sites, the 
technological fix at Giant Mine did not resolve but merely deferred the 
problem. Removing arsenic from the air does not destroy the substance, 
but concentrates it as a fine dust.51 In 1951, Giant Yellowknife Mines began 
to pump the material captured by the Cottrell into old mine chambers, 
sealing off fourteen underground storage compartments containing 
237,000 tonnes of arsenic trioxide by the time the mine closed in 2004. 
Such a massive amount of toxic materials presents an enormous contem-
porary and long-term toxic threat should the storage chambers leak, the 
arsenic mix with groundwater, or a seismic event disturb the underground 
environment. As we discuss below, this problem constitutes a major per-
petual environmental and health risk for all people living in the Great 
Slave Lake region.
Changing Landscapes: The Pine Point Mine
The Pine Point lead-zinc mine was located almost directly south of Giant 
Mine on the opposite shore of Great Slave Lake. The site was first staked 
by the trader Ed Nagle in 1898, providing a major impetus for the govern-
ment to seek a surrender of land from local Dene groups through the sign-
ing of Treaty 8 in 1899.52 After a brief period of exploration in the 1920s 
and a more sustained and intensive effort in the 1950s, Pine Point Mines 
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Ltd., a subsidiary of mining giant Cominco, officially opened the mine 
in 1964, and it became one of the largest and most profitable base metal 
mines in Canadian history. The company also established the open town 
of Pine Point adjacent to the mine, a collection of trailers and bunkhouses 
that quickly became a settlement of two thousand with modern services 
and facilities such as a shopping centre, a bank, and a hotel. Although an-
nual production rates varied, Pine Point Mines shipped roughly 9,628,000 
US tons of concentrated ore dug from forty-seven open pits and two shafts 
over twenty-five years, most of it for further processing at the Cominco 
smelter located in Trail, British Columbia. By 1989 it all came to an end, 
as low mineral prices and high costs associated with the mine prompted 
the company to shut down the mine, and the territorial government to 
remove the town.53
The mine and townsite were located just over sixty kilometres west of 
the Chipewyan (a linguistic group of the Dene) community of Fort Reso-
lution, and a hundred kilometres east of the K’atl’odeeche (Dene) First 
Nation near Hay River. Although Pine Point never presented the same 
issues of acute air and water pollution as at Giant Mine, the mine did im-
pact the local environment of these two Native communities. Even in the 
earlier exploration phase, the cutting of seismic lines and roads destroyed 
traplines in the region, while in the full development phase mining activ-
ity closed access to former hunting areas and fishing creeks.54 Environ-
mental studies from the 1970s suggested that frequent overflows from 
the tailings pond and the pumping of water from the mine had deposited 
heavy metals and sulfuric acid into local streams, potentially affecting 
fish populations.55 A post-closure study from 1998 indicated, however, 
that heavy metal deposition in the water presented no significant risk to 
human health, though oral interviews conducted by the authors revealed 
that local people remain concerned about water quality.56 Perhaps the 
greatest concern for local First Nations is the extensive “mess” the mining 
company left at the site. Abandonment and reclamation activities for the 
extensive property included the complete removal of the town, mine and 
mill infrastructure, the closure of the extensive network of haul roads, 
and the blocking of access to open pits by berms. The 570-hectare tailings 
area was covered with loose gravel and its waters are subject to ongoing 
treatment to reduce high levels of zinc before discharge to the surrounding 
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muskeg, but the area remains a large, moon-like landscape where almost 
no vegetation grows two decades later (Fig. 11.2).57
The mine’s stark and sudden end contrasted sharply with the un-
bridled optimism and boosterism that accompanied its early development. 
Echoing the Stikine Railway proposals discussed by Jonathan Peyton in 
his chapter in this volume, federal government officials regarded the de-
velopment of Pine Point and its associated rail link as a critical gateway 
development, spurring the exploitation of other mineral deposits in the 
Great Slave Lake region and speeding the emergence of a modern indus-
trial economy in the region.58 In 1955, R. Gordon Robertson, Deputy Min-
ister of Northern Affairs and Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, 
testified to the Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects that 
a railway to Great Slave Lake will not be just another railway. 
It is not a railway to a lake, or to open a mine or to serve a 
community. A railway to Great Slave Lake will be one of the 
 
Fig. 11.2: Tailings area at the former Pine Point Mine, where overflow water is 
treated with lime to precipitate zinc. Photo by Arn Keeling.
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great development railroads of the country. It will not bring 
population to the Northwest Territories to the same extent 
that the western railroads brought it to the prairies, but it may 
well bring in the years ahead a comparable increase in the 
wealth of Canada. This railway is quite different from most 
of the branch lines constructed in recent years which were 
destined to serve one mine, or a group of mines; its purpose 
is to open up a whole new region. The fact that there happens 
to be a potential mine of great value at its northern terminus 
is a piece of great good fortune, for it will enable this railroad 
to be built without the long wait for reasonable returns which 
so often has been the lot of a pioneer railroad.59
 
The federal government’s enthusiasm for the project was so great that it 
provided $100 million in subsidies for the railway and associated infra-
structure, including a small hydro-electric project and a highway exten-
sion to the site. For many government officials, this was a small price to 
pay to kick-start an ambitious program of northern development, which 
would also contribute to the growth of a national economy that had gone 
into recession in the late 1950s.60
In her chapter in this volume, Tina Loo describes the efforts of gov-
ernment officials to promote modernization of Inuit in the Keewatin 
Region of the Northwest Territories (now Nunavut), in part through in-
dustrial wage labour opportunities in the Rankin Inlet Mine. Similarly, 
the government promoted the Pine Point Mine as a means to resolve the 
pressing economic issues facing the Native population of the Great Slave 
Region. For many government officials, the new mining economy would 
replace the moribund fur trade (which had experienced low prices during 
the recession of the late 1950s and early 1960s), keeping Native people off 
relief by pulling them into the modern industrial wage economy.61 But as 
the marquee project of the new social and economic development strat-
egy, Pine Point largely failed to fulfill the promise of local employment. 
In the mine’s early stages, there were very few Aboriginal participants 
in the labour force, largely because the government did not extend the 
highway to Fort Resolution until 1972. In 1970, Aboriginal employment 
peaked at 17.1 percent of the mining labour force, and then declined to 
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a steady rate of seven to nine percent through the rest of the decade.62 
How many of these labourers were local to the area is unknown, though 
some leaders in Fort Resolution complained that Cominco double-count-
ed workers who had left and been rehired in the same year, and that most 
of the Aboriginal labour force was made up of itinerant workers from the 
south. Indeed, roughly one-third of the Aboriginal labour force of 78 was 
from outside the region between 1973 and 1976, while in 1978 the figure 
was 25 of 52 workers.63 The turnover rate for Aboriginal workers was also 
high: between 1963 and 1978, Cominco hired 78 residents of Fort Resolu-
tion 125 times, but only 10 stayed for more than a year.64 The reasons for 
the lack of local employment are complex, but there is no doubt that the 
government invested far more in the infrastructure supporting resource 
extraction than it did on roads or training programs to maximize Aborig-
inal participation in the mining industry.65 Company officials complained 
that they had tried to reach out to Fort Resolution, even providing a bus 
for commuting, but high turnover kept the numbers of permanent work-
ers low.66 Ironically, however, employment numbers from the early 1970s 
indicate higher rates of transience among the non-Aboriginal workforce.67 
By the early 1980s, several federal government reports suggested that a 
mineral-led human development strategy had largely failed in the North-
west Territories, with Aboriginal employment rates hovering around five 
percent throughout the region in the late 1970s, and with few spinoff bene-
fits for local communities.68
In the eyes of many Fort Resolution residents in particular, bitter-
ness over the lack of economic benefits associated with the mine is com-
pounded by the legacy of environmental damage left in its wake. Although 
many enjoyed working in the mine, noting in particular the good wages 
and high quality of life in a modern town such as Pine Point, they also 
resent the fact that very little was done to remediate the site and that no 
compensation has been forthcoming for the environmental damage and 
resources extracted in what is considered a traditional use area. In 1993, 
then Chief Bernadette Unka testified to the Royal Commission on Aborig-
inal Peoples about her community’s experience with mining development:
Pine Points [sic] Mines nor Canada have never compensated 
the Dene people that used those areas in their hunting, fish-
ing and trapping. They have never been compensated for their 
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loss or for the land devastation. When I say land devastation, 
if you are to fly over Pine Point Mines you would look down 
and you would look down and think you were flying over the 
moon with the craters and open pits that are left open. The 
people have never been compensated for the hardships and 
the heartaches induced by mineral development. While the 
company creamed the crop at $53 million during their peak 
years, we got very little jobs and what we did get were very 
low-paying jobs.69
 
In an oral interview conducted in 2010, George Balsillie used remarkably 
similar language when he lamented the impact of the mine on the land 
and wildlife:
Oh, it made a mess out there. It’s all just like a moon, you 
know, like when you go on a plane or something … they can 
only fill those holes up partly. Now they have put signs up 
there and gates. You can’t even drive in there. Before you 
used to drive to go hunting and then in the fall time to go for 
moose or something. Now you can’t, because it has all been 
dug up, and you can’t drive on that road and you can’t drive 
on this road. I suppose they made a … well, I’ll say it, they 
made a mess. They should have just, you know, sure it was a 
mine put gates around it … it’s all fenced in, but people are 
not crazy enough to go in there anyways, but you want to go 
hunting, you gotta see if there’s other routes open. That’s the 
only thing.70
 
Although he noted some recent recovery in vegetation and wildlife popu-
lations, Gord Beaulieu recorded similar themes as he recollected his first 
impressions of the mine after living for several years in Yellowknife:
But a few years later I moved back on this side of the lake, 
and to me it was just like a wasteland. There was nothing. 
There was no life, nothing. Even the trees were dead. It was 
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just like a wasteland. Roads all over the place, you know? And 
no life. Like now, it’s been twenty-five years now, and the life 
is coming back to the land over there. We see moose tracks 
and we see other wildlife around there. And everything turns 
green now, in the summer. But back then, when the mine first 
shut down, it was just like a wasteland. And it reminded me of 
those Mad Max movies.71
Some K’atl’ochdeeche First Nation elders, whose reserve lies west of Pine 
Point along the Hay River, shared memories of how the mine brought 
work, especially during the construction phase. But they also decried how 
the company abandoned the town and landscape, and, as Fred Tambour 
noted, “just leave it laying around like that lookin’ like a real ghost ter-
ritory, to me.”72 These conflicting memories—the “good life” associated 
with wage work and a modern town, the shattered landscape of the mine, 
and the possible recovery of the land despite the unfinished remediation 
of the mine—have all come to the fore in recent years, as the community 
considers a new proposal to mine the Pine Point area.
From discovery to development, and eventual closure and abandon-
ment, then, the advent of mining around Great Slave Lake transformed 
environment and society in the region. On the one hand, mineral de-
velopment brought unprecedented settlement and infrastructure to this 
remote frontier and generated considerable wealth; on the other, mining 
left a legacy of environmental degradation and economic marginalization 
that disproportionately affected the region’s Indigenous inhabitants. This 
history—a source of contestation between settler and Native communities 
in the region—echoes the experience of other historic mining frontiers, 
such as the US west, where minerals have attracted outsiders and gen-
erated conflicts over land, labour, and livelihood.73 However, as we have 
found at Giant and Pine Point, this history is more than past business; 
it remains a potent source of conflict over both the physical and cultural 
legacies of mining, especially as these “abandoned” sites become the focus 
of renewed mining-related activity.
11 | Ghost Towns and Zombie Mines 399
Giant and Pine Point as Zombie Mines
At Giant Mine in Yellowknife, the “reanimation” of the abandoned mine 
site was instigated by the toxic deposits left behind following decades of 
gold extraction and arsenic collection. Although current activities are not 
aimed at redevelopment for minerals, the remediation of the mine site 
entails complex technical questions and large capital investments that 
have prompted intense regulatory and community scrutiny. When min-
ing ceased at Giant, most of the surface works were abandoned intact, 
including the headframe, mill, and ore-roasting plant, and a small aban-
doned town site was left adjacent to the mine works. Millions of tonnes 
of arsenic-contaminated tailings filled several impoundments near the 
mine. Of greatest concern, however, were the 237,000 tonnes of toxic ar-
senic trioxide dust stored in sealed underground chambers. This odour-
less, white-powder form of arsenic is considered a human carcinogen 
and subject to dispersion into the environment through the atmosphere, 
in solution, or, if heated, in gaseous form. The concentration of arsenic 
wastes at Giant makes it one of the largest and most expensive toxic waste 
sites in Canada.74
Underground storage of the arsenic initially aimed to take advantage 
of the presumed permafrost conditions as a permanent storage facility. 
However, the extensive transformation of the underground environment 
by decades of mining meant that permafrost has never re-established in 
the mined-out chambers, and the combination of water infiltration and 
a rising water table threatens to mobilize the arsenic through ground-
water and into the environment. As a result, water has to be continuously 
pumped from the mine and treated to remove arsenic (again). The mine’s 
operators and, subsequently, INAC have sought various solutions to the 
problem.75 Schemes to extract the stored arsenic from Yellowknife-area 
mines (including Giant and Con), process it, and sell it for use in wood 
preservatives had been considered since the 1980s.76 But concerns over 
spills and the lack of a viable market meant this alternative for disposal of 
the remaining arsenic dust never gained traction.
When the mine’s owners, Royal Oak Mines, went into receivership 
in 1999, INAC assumed responsibility for the mine’s liabilities, while an-
other company, Miramar, operated the mine. Since the closure for good 
of Giant in 2004, INAC has proposed a comprehensive remediation of the 
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mine, including a novel method of securing the arsenic underground. The 
government’s plan, estimated to cost over $600 million, calls for the drill-
ing and installation of thermosyphons (passive heat-exchange convection 
pipes) surrounding the underground arsenic chambers, allowing for the 
re-freezing of the rock using refrigerants. Thereafter, the freezing would 
be maintained through the circulation of carbon dioxide in the pipes, 
which exchanges heat from the warming ground to the cooler air (Fig. 
3). According to proponents, the frozen chambers will require mainten-
ance “in perpetuity.” The remediation plan also calls for the removal of 
contaminated soils (filling open pits), revegetation of tailings, removal of 
buildings, and rehabilitation of a polluted creek running through the site. 
Virtually all the surface works would be removed.77
Although the project aims to mitigate a toxic hazard EA process is 
over, these plans have met with controversy. At a meeting in May 2010 
with the Yellowknives Dene First Nation at Ndilo, sceptical community 
 
Fig. 11.3: Thermosyphon test plot, Giant Mine Remediation Project. Photo by John 
Sandlos.
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members posed tough questions to INAC consultants and staff about 
the long-term effects of arsenic in the environment. Many doubted they 
would ever again be able to gather berries or consume fish from the mine 
area.78 In debates over the remediation plan, history and memory also 
assert themselves. Some at the community meeting recalled being tested 
as children for arsenic exposure in the studies mentioned above, and the 
community continues to fear poisoned water and fish in Back Bay, which 
they had been previously warned not to consume. The Yellowknives Dene 
First Nation presentation to an earlier environmental assessment hearing 
on the remediation outlined the Dene people’s long-term occupancy of the 
mine site and asserted that they were never consulted about the original 
development. After outlining the history of exposure and exclusion at the 
site, the First Nation requested that the environmental assessment process 
investigate these “legacy” issues and the full scope of the development’s 
historical and contemporary impacts on the community and its land. For 
its part, the territorial regulator, the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Im-
pact Review Board, decided to restrict its environmental assessment to the 
site remediation plan itself, excluding questions of historical impacts and 
any environmental effects beyond the remediation of the mine site itself.79
First Nations people and critics in the town of Yellowknife also ques-
tion who bears the ultimate burden of exposure and care for this toxic site. 
In oral interviews, elders and community members from the Yellowknives 
Dene linked their history of exposure to their concerns about the long-
term hazards left behind in their traditional territory. Some questioned 
the ability of the government and its technological solutions to protect the 
community and its land for generations to come.80 The requirement for 
perpetual care of the frozen arsenic chambers, located right on the door-
step of Yellowknife (and a regional population of about twenty thousand) 
raised significant concerns from civic officials and local community mem-
bers. In fact, the City of Yellowknife (rather than territorial regulators) 
triggered the environmental assessment of the project in 2008, responding 
to public concerns (and those of the Yellowknives Dene First Nation) over 
the supposed permanence of the arsenic freezing solution (Fig. 4). Alterna-
tives North, a local environmental group, has prepared a submission to 
this ongoing assessment examining the concept and practice of “perpetual 
care” of contaminated sites.81 When the Mackenzie Valley Environmental 
Impact Review Board released its decision on the Giant Mine Remediation 
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Project in June 2013, it represented a major victory for Alternatives North, 
the Yellowknives Dene, and other concerned citizens. Although the report 
covered many issues, the board was severely critical of the government’s 
“leave it and freeze it” approach. It recommended a reduced time frame 
for the project (to one hundred years, with investment and research on 
a more permanent solution), periodic reviews of new approaches every 
twenty years, and the creation of an independent oversight committee to 
monitor key environmental issues during the lengthy remediation pro-
cess. Although the fate of these recommendations rests with the federal 
cabinet, the complexity and intractability of the environmental problems 
at Giant Mine guarantee that the site will remain reanimated and in the 
public eye for decades, if not centuries to come.82
 
Fig. 11.4: In spite of its slogan, “Moving Forward Together,” the federal Giant Mine 
Remediation Project has generated considerable controversy in Yellowknife. Photo 
by John Sandlos.
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Fig. 11.5: Open pit at Pine Point, slowly filling with water. Note berms around edge 
in background. Photo by John Sandlos.
The reanimation of the Pine Point site, in contrast, involves both re-
newed mining activity and a proposed “brownfield” mineral processing 
site. By the turn of this century, the scarred landscape of the mine began 
to show signs of “healing.” Slowly, vegetation began to recolonize dis-
turbed areas, and local residents noted the presence of moose, lynx, and 
even woodland caribou in the area, and worried that these animals might 
fall into unfenced open pits or become sick from drinking pit water (Fig. 
11.5). Some hunting and trapping resumed in the area, and residents of 
both Hay River and Fort Resolution, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, 
began to use the extensive road network and cleared spaces of the mine 
area and former town as an informal recreation area for camping, all-ter-
rain vehicles, and other activities.
The resurgence of mineral markets brought renewed geological inter-
est to the area, and in 2004 a junior mining company, Tamerlane Ven-
tures, began to acquire rights to unmined, historic lead-zinc deposits near 
the former Cominco mine. Tamerlane commenced an extensive drilling 
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program that included activities at the former mine site, and, in 2008, ap-
plied to operate a one-million-tonne “test mine” to produce high-grade 
ores from its holdings just west of the old mine. Tamerlane exploration 
crews are regularly encountered in the maze of haul roads around Pine 
Point, as well as further to the west where its R-190 deposit is staked. More 
recently, the company announced its delineation of millions more tonnes 
of ore at the Pine Point site, which it had hoped to bring into production by 
2013, “just when the demand for lead and zinc begins to peak,” according 
to CEO Mike Willett.83
Tamerlane’s plans to revive mining at Pine Point stirred the ghosts 
in the region. During environmental assessment hearings, residents from 
Fort Resolution expressed their concerns about the legacies of past min-
ing and their fears that the benefits of development would, once again, 
pass them by. Like the interviewees cited above, participants at the public 
hearing expressed their anger that the previous Cominco operation had 
left a degraded landscape, and challenged Tamerlane’s contention that 
there would be no cumulative impacts at the site. The Deninu Ku’e First 
Nation, of Fort Resolution, wrote: “This is a sensitive land in the process 
of healing, why is [the developer’s biophysical assessment consultant] say-
ing there will be no cumulative impacts in this area?”84 For its part, the 
company declared that it “wanted to avoid the mistakes of past mining 
activities.”85 But for many Fort Resolution residents, the current develop-
ment and past experiences cannot be neatly severed. The social, econom-
ic, and environmental effects of the former Pine Point mine continue to 
resonate in the community, whether concerns about the ongoing impact 
of historic mining on traditional harvesting activities, resentment at the 
low levels of Aboriginal employment at the Pine Point mine, or memories 
of the disruptive influence of alcohol and outsiders brought by the exten-
sion of the road from Pine Point to Fort Resolution.86 Memories of the 
former mine and town are not universally negative—at hearings and in 
oral history interviews conducted by the authors, some residents proudly 
recalled working and living in Pine Point—but these memories are also 
tinged with regret at the hardships caused by the closure of the mine and 
the disappearance of the town.87
Many in the Northwest Territories are uncertain of the company’s en-
vironmental commitments, given Tamerlane’s leadership. The company’s 
executive chairman and CFO is Margaret Kent (formerly Peggy Witte), the 
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former CEO of Royal Oak Mines Ltd., a company notorious in the north 
for its poor labour and environmental record. Royal Oak owned Giant 
Mine in Yellowknife during the period of the vicious 1991–92 strike, which 
was tragically punctuated by the murder of nine replacement workers by 
a disgruntled striker who planted a bomb in the mine—more ghosts.88 In 
addition to overseeing the massive underground accumulation of arsenic 
at Giant, the company was also responsible for several abandoned mines 
in the region, including the toxic Colomac Mine, but managed to evade 
financial liability for these sites by declaring bankruptcy. Kent’s return to 
the territory has sparked considerable comment and concern that Royal 
Oak’s dismal environmental and labour record might accompany her.89
More recently still, the former Pine Point mill site has attracted re-
development interest due to its status as a brownfield. The growing global 
demand for rare earth element (REE) metals (used in high-tech devices 
such as computers, hybrid cars, and flat-screen monitors) launched the 
rapid development of an REE deposit on the north shore of Great Slave 
Lake. The Nechalacho deposit, being developed by Avalon Rare Metals, is 
the second-largest in the world, and drilling and development activities 
since 2005, along with rising prices, have brought it close to production 
feasibility.90 As part of its planning, the company initially discussed siting 
a hydrometallurgical processing facility at the former Pine Point mill site, 
just across the lake from the mine, where it could take advantage of the 
existing power and transportation infrastructure, as well as the existing 
tailings containment facility. Throughout the planning stage, this project 
generated considerable discussion and interest at Fort Resolution and Hay 
River for the potential of both employment and cash benefits from both 
the mine and the production facility. In July 2013, the mine and hydromet 
project obtained regulatory approval, though uncertainty remains the 
watchword for this project, as Avalon warned that they still had the 
“daunting” task of raising $1.5 billion in capital investments, and as the 
company has not fully committed to siting the processing at Pine Point.91
Ironically, one potential hitch in the redevelopment plan emerged 
in Avalon’s pre-feasibility study, released in June 2010: the cost of trans-
porting chemical reagents to the hydromet facility at Pine Point led the 
company to consider other sites in southern Canada. In response, the for-
mer head of the NWT & Nunavut Chamber of Mines called on the federal 
government to re-establish the rail line to Pine Point, removed after the 
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closure of the former mine. “They took out the existing line for no real 
reason at all, and it would have made a huge difference to the viability of 
a hydromet facility at Pine Point,” he said.92 In a cruel twist, the trackless 
Great Slave Lake Railway spur line—that symbol of failed northern mod-
ernization and development plans—now stands as an obstacle to redevel-
opment, even in its moribund state.
Conclusion
In the Canadian north, redevelopment and reclamation activities not only 
reawaken local conflicts over the impacts of past mining activities, but 
also reflect a renewed discourse of minerals-based modernization and 
development in the region. Rising prices in global mineral markets have, 
until the recent commodities bust, spurred massive investments in min-
eral exploration and development in Canada’s three northern territories 
(Nunavut, Canada’s eastern arctic territory, separated from the NWT in 
1998). Mineral exploration and deposit appraisal expenditures through-
out Canada reached a record $3.3 billion in 2008, and, while slowed by the 
global economic downturn, rebounded strongly to new record levels prior 
to very recent declines in commodity prices.93 This investment, and the 
new mines it spawns or old ones it reopens, is welcomed by many in the 
territories, whose economies remain strongly dependent upon extractive 
industries. Echoing the development vision of past promoters, contempor-
ary government and industry figures forecast extensive mineral develop-
ments as drivers of the northern economy for years to come. For instance, 
in 2009 the NWT & Nunavut Chamber of Mines released an ambitious 
infrastructure proposal calling for the construction of railways, roads, air 
routes, an arctic port, and new power developments (including “pocket” 
nuclear plants) to drive northern mineral extraction.94
Our research suggests that such grandiose visions of minerals-based 
arctic industrialization would benefit from some critical historical-geo-
graphical perspective. The history of mineral development and abandon-
ment in the Great Slave Lake region reveals that while mining brought 
settlement and prosperity to parts of the region, it also acted to advance 
the colonial objectives of the Canadian state in a hitherto lightly set-
tled, predominantly Aboriginal territory. In the north, where extreme 
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climatic conditions, poor soils, and distance from markets long restricted 
Euro-Canadian economic interests to the fur trade, mineral development 
in the twentieth century held the key to the final “industrial assimilation” 
of these far-flung territories into the orbit of Canadian state and capital.95 
The geography of minerals, in turn, shaped the pattern of this process: dis-
continuous, nodal developments centred around economically viable de-
posits of precious metals, and, later, other high-value industrial minerals.
The government sought to enrol Aboriginal inhabitants into the mod-
ern mineral economy of the north, but by and large the results of this 
process were displacement, marginalization, and the creation of unstable, 
“cyclonic” economies prone to sudden collapse.96 In a region without a 
highly developed agricultural or urban economy, the classic mining 
boom-bust pattern has proven particularly devastating, although uneven, 
as the contrasting fates of Yellowknife and Pine Point illustrate. Aborigin-
al communities were also disproportionately affected by the environment-
al changes associated with mineral development. At Giant Mine, the Dene 
communities of N’dilo and Dettah found their waters, lands, food, and 
bodies contaminated with arsenic from mine wastes, even as they strug-
gled to engage with the sudden arrival of modern settlement life and state 
control. In the South Slave region, Dene people found intermittent work 
at the Pine Point mine (particularly in its construction phase), but also 
struggled with the impacts of large-scale landscape transformations on 
traditional livelihoods and social arrangements.
While the closure of mining communities may leave behind “ghost 
towns,” zombie mines emerge where renewed activity at former mine sites 
threatens to reawaken or reproduce the negative experiences and out-
comes of previous mining operations. At both Pine Point and Giant—as at 
numerous other sites in the Canadian north where former mines are being 
brought back to life—historical conflicts over the impacts and benefits of 
mining are being revisited through the reanimation of the mines them-
selves. Certainly there is some truth to the argument, often advanced by 
mining interests, that contemporary mine development, redevelopment, 
and remediation takes place under very different historical circumstances 
today than it did in the 1950s and 1960s, with the industry-led Whitehorse 
Mining Initiative of the early 1990s marking an increased attentiveness to 
Aboriginal political and economic priorities and environmental perform-
ance issues.97 Both in Canada and internationally, the mining industry’s 
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turn toward “sustainability” has included a reckoning with the negative 
legacies of mining, including the problem of abandoned mines and the 
links between mining and the dispossession of Indigenous peoples.98 
Nevertheless, those proposing redevelopment or remediation, whether 
governments or mining companies, often fail to recognize how their ac-
tivities can stir deeply held feelings about historic mining. For local First 
Nations communities, old mines are not simply historical artefacts; their 
legacies persist in landscapes encountered through daily activities and 
memories of work, life changes, or other experiences, positive or negative. 
As Ginger Gibson wrote in relation to diamond mining developments in 
Dene territory in the 1990s, modern miners “may seek to enter the pol-
itical geography of the north without acknowledging the past, [but] this 
relational view of history reveals they will arrive with the shadows of 
ghost-mines behind them.”99 When these “ghosts” reside at the same site 
as the original mine, we argue, these sites are more properly considered 
zombie mines. The global trend toward accelerated mineral development 
and the renewed interest in abandoned mine sites for both remediation 
and redevelopment suggests an important role for mining historians in 
highlighting the importance of this history in contemporary debates over 
the industry and its impacts.
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